

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0158

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: WHAT NUMERICAL DATA MUST BE AGREED
FOR A PHASE I MBFR AGREEMENT

REF: (A) USNATO 0808; (B) USNATO 0736; (C) STATE 28114;
(D) MBFR VIENNA 0026; (E) USNATO 1762

1. WE NOTE THAT THE MBFR WORKING GROUP HAS SUBMITTED
ITS FIRST REPORT AND THAT THE SPC IS MOVING AHEAD TO
DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF WHICH DATA IT IS
ESSENTIAL TO AGREE ON WITH THE EAST FOR AN MBFR AGREE-
MENT. BELOW IS THE TEXT OF A PRELIMINARY DELEGATION
EXAMINATION OF THIS ISSUE INTENDED AS BACKGROUND FOR
WASHINGTON AGENCIES IN DEVELOPING GUIDANCE TO USNATO

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FOR THE BRUSSELS DISCUSSION. THE PAPER WAS WRITTEN

PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF THE WORKING GROUP PAPER. IT REACHES THE SAME GENERAL CONCLUSION, THAT AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON STARTING FIGURES IS NOT ESSENTIAL FOR THE WEST AND THAT EXCHANGE OF DATA IS THEREFORE NOT A NECESSARY PRECONDITION FOR REACHING A PHASE I AGREEMENT. SPECIFIC COMMENTS ON THE WORKING GROUP REPORT ARE CONTAINED IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE.

2. THIS SUBJECT IS MANIFESTLY A COMPLICATED ONE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ANY SPC STUDY ON IT WILL BE REGARDED ONLY AS A STUDY AND THAT THE US WILL DISCOURAGE EFFORTS TO DISTILL FROM THE STUDY DEFINITIVE AND BINDING CONCLUSIONS AT THIS TIME.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

I. SUMMARY

1. THIS PAPER CONSIDERS THE ISSUE OF WHAT NUMERICAL DATA THE EAST AND WEST MUST AGREE ON TO REACH AN MBFR PHASE I AGREEMENT. FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, THIS PAPER ASSUMES EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL AND SEEKS TO ANALYZE (A) WHAT FIGURES SHOULD BE AGREED WITH THE EAST ORALLY IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A GENERAL UNDERSTANDING ENABLING NEGOTIATORS TO TURN TO FORMULATION OF A PHASE I TEXT; AND (B) WHAT SPECIFIC FIGURES SHOULD BE WRITTEN INTO THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

2. TO LIMIT THE PROBLEM, THE PAPER DISCUSSES DATA FOR MANPOWER IN GENERAL. THAT IS, IT DOES NOT CONSIDER WHETHER AIR MANPOWER AS SUCH WOULD BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS AND THUS, IT DOES NOT DEAL WITH SUCH ISSUES AS SERVICE SUBCEILINGS. IT DOES NOT DEAL WITH DATA ON ARMAMENTS, AND ISSUE WHICH IS BETTER HANDLED IN THE CONTEXT OF ARMAMENTS LIMITATIONS. NOR DOES THE PAPER ADDRESS THE PRECISE FORMULATIONS WHICH WOULD BE USED TO WRITE AGREED DATA INTO THE TEXT OF A AGREEMENT OR THE ISSUE OF WHETHER DATA WOULD BE WRITTEN INTO THE MAIN TEXT OF A AGREEMENT OR
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INTO PROTOCOLS. THE PAPER ASSUMES THAT THE SOVIETS CONCUR THAT THEIR AGREEMENT TO WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES IN THE FORM OF A TANK ARMY CAN BE WRITTEN INTO THE TEXT OF A AGREEMENT IN EXPLICIT FORM.

3. THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED ARE HIGHLY TENTATIVE AND MUST REMAIN SO AT THIS TIME. THE INTENSITY OF SOVIET RESISTANCE TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN TYPES OF DATA HAS NOT BEEN FULLY TESTED AT THIS STAGE

OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS IN PARTICULAR TRUE FOR SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE SPECIFIC FIGURES IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT, WHICH IN THE NATURE OF THINGS HAS NOT BEEN TESTED AT ALL. IF AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH THE EAST ON MAJOR ISSUES OF THE NEGOTIATION THEY MIGHT POSSIBLY BE LESS NEGATIVE ON THE SUBJECT OF NUMERICAL DATA THAN THEY HAVE BEEN THUS FAR, BUT THIS IS FAR FROM CERTAIN.

4. THE PAPER TENTATIVELY CONCLUDES THAT THE MINIMUM WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR INCLUSION OF FIGURES IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT IS (A) EXPLICIT AGREEMENT IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT ON THE NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE US AND USSR IN PHASE I; AND (B) EXPLICIT FIGURES ON THE RESIDUAL LEVELS FOR US AND USSR FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES. EVEN IF A CONSENSUS SHOULD BE REACHED AMONG THE ALLIES THAT THE ABOVE WOULD BE A ACCEPTABLE MINIMUM, THIS WOULD OF COURSE NOT MEAN THAT IT WOULD NOT BE DESIRABLE TACTICALLY TO CONTINUE PRESSING THE EAST FOR MORE. UP TO THE POINT THAT IT BECAME EVIDENT THIS TACTIC WAS BLOCKING AGREEMENT ON OTHER ISSUES.

II. THE PROBLEM

5. GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE MBFR SUBJECT MATTER AND OF THE ALLIED PHASE I PROPOSAL, THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT IDEALLY MIGHT INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING FIGURES:
A. THE AGREED STARTING MANPOWER TOTALS OF BOTH WARSAW PACT AND NATO, INCLUDING STARTING TOTALS FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA.

B. THE MODE OF COMPUTING REDUCTIONS, E.G.,
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15 PERCENT OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF US AND SOVIET FORCES.

C. TOTAL REDUCTIONS FOR THE US AND USSR IN NUMBERS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

D. THE NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS FOR US AND USSSR
MANPOWER FOLLOWING PHASE I WITHDRAWALS; AND

E. THE NUMERICAL COLLECTIVE MANPOWER CEILINGS
FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES FOR NATO AND THE PACT
AFTER DEDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

6. HOWEVER, THE SECRETIVE NATURE OF THE EASTERN
SYSTEM, AT ITS MOST INTENSE AS REGARDS MILITARY INFOR-
MATION, AND THE FAILURE OF ALLIED EFFORTS IN VIENNA TO
GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO EXCHANGE OF DATA AFTER A YEAR
OF PERSISTENT EFFORT, JUSTIFY AN ASSESSMENT THAT THERE WILL
BE CONSIDERABLE DIFFICULTY IN GAINING EASTERN AGREEMENT
TO INCLUDE THESE FIGURES IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT.

7. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE SYMMETRICAL EASTERN
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APPROACH TO REDUCTIONS AND THE HIGHLY ASYMMETRICAL
WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH PROBABLY ALSO AFFECTS
OR CONTRIBUTES TO THE NEGATIVE EASTERN ATTITUDE.
THE ALLIES MAY ULTIMATELY SUCCEED IN BRINGING

THE EAST AWAY FROM ITS ORIGINAL POSITION TOWARDS THE ALLIED POSITION. NONETHELESS, ON THE BASIS OF PAST EXPERIENCE, THE EAST IS UNLIKELY TO DESIRE THAT DATA PRECISELY DOCUMENTING THE EXTENT OF ITS DEPARTURE FROM ITS ORIGINAL STARTING POSITION BE WRITTEN INTO A PHASE I AGREEMENT. THIS CONCLUSION IS REINFORCED BY THE SOVIET EMPHASIS ON EQUALITY AND EQUAL TREATMENT REFLECTING DEEPLY HELD EASTERN VALUES.

TAKEN TOGETHER, THE FACTORS DESCRIBED HERE INDICATE THAT THE EAST WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE TO RESIST BOTH INFORMAL ORAL AGREEMENT ON A FULL RANGE OF SPECIFIC FIGURES AND POSSIBLY EVEN MORE INTENSELY, THE INCLUSION OF A FULL RANGE OF FIGURES IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT.

9. THE ANALYTICAL TASK FOR THE ALLIES, THEREFORE IS TO DETERMINE (A) WHAT IS THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF NUMERICAL DATA ON WHICH AGREEMENT MUST BE REACHED INFORMALLY WITH THE EAST TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL BASIS FOR WESTERN COMMITMENTS AND (B) WHAT IS THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF NUMERICAL DATA WHICH WOULD HAVE TO APPEAR IN A TEXT OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT FOR THAT AGREEMENT TO CONTAIN CLEAR OBLIGATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE TACTICAL AND OTHER BENEFITS IN CONTINUED WESTERN EFFORTS TO GET THE EAST TO AGREE TO EXCHANGE DATA, FOR THE ALLIES TO CATEGORICALLY INSIST ON DATA BEYOND THE MINIMUM NEEDED WOULD INCREASE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING TASK.

10. THE EAST'S MOST RECENT POSITION ON HOW MUCH NUMERICAL DATA WOULD BE REFLECTED IN AN AGREEMENT WAS PUT FORWARD IN THE INFORMAL SESSION ON FEBRUARY 11, 1975. IN REPLY TO WESTERN QUESTIONS, SMIRNOVSKY AND STRULAK ONCE AGAIN REFUSED TO DISCUSS DATA UNTIL AFTER AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE HAD BEEN REACHED ON THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH SIDES. THEY COMMENTED INFORMALLY
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THAT THE EAST ENVISAGED THAT THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT WOULD CONTAIN THE PERCENTAGE BY WHICH THE FORCES OF EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT WOULD BE REDUCED AND THAT THE ATTACHED SPECIAL PROOCOL GIVING DETAILS OF REDUCTIONS WOULD SPECIFY THE NUMERICAL TOTAL OF REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH PARTICIPANT. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THIS POSITION WAS AUTHORITATIVE AND WOULD BE ADHERED TO. ARTICLE 3 OF THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT PROVIDES ONLY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A "LIST OF THE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS TO BE REDUCED." TO JUDGE FROM INFORMAL EASTERN COMMENTS IN

THE NEGOTIATIONS THUS FAR, THE EAST MIGHT NOT CONTEMPLATE PUTTING ANY SPECIFIC NUMBERS IN THE TEXT OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT AND ENVISAGES THAT THE PROPOSED SEPARATE PROTOCOL WOULD CONTAIN ONLY THE DESIGNATIONS OF UNITS TO BE WITHDRAWN OR REDUCED AND NOT NUMERICAL STRENGTHS.

III. ANALYSIS OF NUMBERS NEEDED

11. THE FIVE CATEGORIES OF NUMBERS ALREADY LISTED ARE ANALYZED BELOW TO ASCERTAIN ON WHICH OF THEM IT IS ESSENTIAL TO AGREE WITH THE EAST.

A. STARTING TOTALS

12. THE EAST MAY NEVER EXPLICITLY AGREE ON STARTING TOTALS WITH THE WEST. IN ADDITION TO THE

EAST'S GENERAL RELUCTANCE TO DIVULGE DATA ON ITS FORCES, TO AGREE ON OVERALL FORCE STRENGTHS OF EACH SIDE BEFORE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD WEAKEN S THE EASTERN CASE AGAINST A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BECAUSE IT WOULD DOCUMENT THE EXISTANCE OF THE DISPARITY ON THE BASIS OF AGREED DATA.

13. EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON STARTING TOTALS WOULD HAVE GREATEST RELEVANCE TO REACHING A COMMON CEILING IN PHASE II. IF THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT IN PHASE I BOTH ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND ON STARTING TOTALS FOR EACH SIDE, THEN, ONCE A SPECIFIC FIGURE FOR
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THE COMMON CEILING WAS AGREED IN PHASE II, THERE COULD BE NO FURTHER SERIOUS DISPUTE OVER THE TOTAL REDUCTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY EACH IN PHASE II. IT IS CLEAR THAT AGREEMENT ON THIS POINT WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

14. NONETHELESS, EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON THESE STARTING FIGURES DOES NOT SEEM AN ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON THE SIZE OF PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

B. MODE OF REDUCTIONS

15. NOR DOES IT APPEAR NECESSARY TO REACH UNDERSTANDING WITH THE EAST ON AN AGREED MODE OF REDUCTIONS E.G. THAT A CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED ON BOTH SIDES. IF THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT SPECIFIES THE NUMBER OF SOVIET SOLDIERS TO BE WITHDRAWN, THERE IS NO NEED TO SPECIFY EXPLICITLY

THE BASIS OR RATIONALE ON WHICH AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED. AS PRESENTLY PROPOSED, THE COMMON CEILING
CONCEPT WOULD NOT REQUIRE SPECIFICATION OF A NUMERICAL

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LEVEL. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH INCLUSION OF PERCENTAGE
FIGURES ON THE MODE OF REDUCTIONS IN A TEXT WOULD
WORK FOR US AND SOVIET PHASE I MANPOWER REDUCTIONS,
IT WOULD BE A BAD PRECEDENT FOR PHASE II, AND THE
ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY NOT INSIST ON THEIR
INCLUSION IN THE TEXT.

C. NUMBER OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED.

16. IT WOULD ON THE OTHER HAND BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE
TO REACH EXPLICIT AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST ON THE NUMBER
OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED BY THE US AND USSR, BOTH ON AN
INFORMAL BASIS AND ALSO FOR INCLUSION IN THE TEXT OF

AN AGREEMENT. TAKEN TOGETHER, INCLUSION IN THE
TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT OF AGREED NUMBERS TO BE REDUCED,
PLUS THE RESIDUAL NUMERICAL CEILINGS FOR US AND SOVIET
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FORCES, WOULD PROVIDE ADEQUATE CLARITY BOTH AS
TO FUTURE OBLIGATIONS AND THE NATURE OF THE AGREEMENT
REACHED.

17. TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE FURTHER, IF THE EAST
WOULD NOT AGREE TO INCLUDE NUMBERS OF FORCES REDUCED IN
A TEXT, THEORETICALLY A SOLUTION MIGHT STILL BE FOUND.
FOR EXAMPLE, HAD EAST AND WEST REACHED A CLEAR INFORMAL
UNDERSTANDING ON THE NUMBERS OF PHASE I US AND SOVIET WITHDRAWALS
AND THE EAST AGREED TO SPECIFY NUMERICAL RESIDUAL CEILINGS FOR US
AND SOVIET FORCES IN A TEXT, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE
WEST TO MAKE A UNCHALLENGED UNILATERAL STATEMENT AT THE TIME OF
SIGNATURE ABOUT THE STARTING POINT OF BOTH SOVIET AND US FORCES AT TH
E
TIME OF SIGNATURE AND FOR BOTH SIDES TO OBLIGATE THEM-
SELVES TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES TO THE AGREED RESIDUAL
CEILING IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT.

18. PRESSING THE CASE STILL FURTHER FOR ANALYTICAL
PURPOSES, IT IS THEORETICALLY POSSIBLE TO CONCEIVE OF A
SITUATION WHERE CLEAR ORAL UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED
BETWEEN EAST AND WEST ON THE NUMBER OF US AND SOVIET
REDUCTIONS, BUT THE EAST HAD AGEED ONLY ON INCLUSION OF NUMBERS
OF US AND SOVIET FORCES RESIDUAL LEVELS IN THE TEXT OF AN
AGREEMENT, AND THE WEST WAS PLACED IN A POSITION
TO OBSERVE THE DEPARTURE FROM THE REDUCTION AREA
OF A NUMBER OF SOVIET SOLDIERS. IN THIS CASE, THE
AGREEMENT WOULD MERELY SPECIFY THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD GO
DOWN TO A SPECIFIED NUMERICAL CEILING WHICH THEY WOULD
MAINTAIN IN THE FUTURE.

19. HOWEVER, THIS MINIMAL INCLUSION OF NUMERICAL
DATA COULD MAKE IT DIFFICULT TO CONVINCE WESTERN OPINION
THAT AN UNAMBIGUOUS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED. THE EAST
SHOULD BE HELD TO ITS INFORMAL STATEMENTS THAT THE
FORCES WITHDRAWN WOULD BE SPECIFIED BOTH AS TO NUMBER
AND AS TO TYPE.

D. RESIDUAL US AND SOVIET FORCE LEVELS

20. IN THE ABSTRACT, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FOREGO
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AGREEMENT ON RESIDUAL LEVELS OF SOVIET AND US FORCES IF THE EAST WOULD AGREE TO SPECIFY IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT THE STARTING POINT AND THE AGREED NUMBER OF REDUCTIONS FOR BOTH SIDES. HOWEVER, AT PRESENT, IT APPEARS DOUBTFUL THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITH THE EAST TO INCLUDE BOTH THESE TOTALS IN THE TEXT. IF IT COULD, IT SHOULD PROVE EASY ENOUGH TO BRING THE EAST TO AGREE ALSO ON INCLUSION OF A SPECIFIC RESIDUAL FIGURE.

21. ON THE OTHER HAND, AN EAST-WEST TROOP REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH DID NOT SPECIFY IN NUMERICAL TERMS THE RESIDUAL MANPOWER LEVELS WHICH BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED TO MAINTAIN IN THE FUTURE WOULD NOT REPRESENT A CLEAR EAST-WEST CONTRACT ESTABLISHING A CLEAR BARRIER TO RE-ENTRY OF SOVIET FORCES. IT WOULD NOT BE CONVINCING TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. IT WOULD NOT PROVIDE A CLEAR REFERENCE POINT FOR POSSIBLE DISPUTES OVER CLAIMED FORCE INCREASES AND COULD THEREFORE BE A SOURCE OF CONTINUAL EAST-WEST FRICTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE AFTER AN AGREEMENT WENT INTO EFFECT.

22. IN A SITUATION WHERE STARTING TOTALS WERE NOT CONTAINED IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT, INCLUSION IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT OF NUMBERS OF WITHDRAWALS BUT NOT FOR THE RESIDUAL CEILINGS WOULD NOT GIVE SUFFICIENT CLARITY AS TO OBLIGATIONS FOR THE FUTURE. NOR WOULD IT ESTABLISH A SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE LEGAL BARRIER TO INCREASES OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, IF THE SOVIETS WERE CHALLENGED IN THE FUTURE AS TO INCREASES IN THEIR FORCE LEVELS, THEY COULD POINT OUT THAT NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON STARTING LEVELS AND THAT NO NUMERICAL RESIDUAL LEVEL WAS SPECIFIED IN AN AGREEMENT. THEY COULD STATE THAT THEY HAD MADE THE AGREED WITHDRAWALS, AND FLATLY CLAIM THAT THEY HAD NOT VIOLATED THE REQUIREMENT NOT TO EXCEED THE (UNSPECIFIED) RESIDUAL LEVEL OF THEIR FORCES.

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23. IF THE EAST ACTUALLY ADHERED TO IT, THE SUGGESTED EASTERN APPROACH DESCRIBED ABOVE, OF INCLUDING IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT THE AGREED PERCENTAGE OF REDUCTIONS, PLUS A SPECIFIED TOTAL OF REDUCTIONS, WOULD PERMIT CALCULATION BOTH OF THE STARTING POINT OF REDUCTIONS AND OF RESIDUAL CEILINGS. HOWEVER, THE METHOD DOES NOT PRODUCE THE DESIRED CLARITY OF EXPOSITION FOR THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO RESIDUAL CEILINGS. IF THE EAST IS IN FACT READY TO GO THIS FAR, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO BRING IT TO ACCEPT INCLUSION OF AGREED CEILINGS IN THE TEXT OF AN AGREEMENT.

24. THEORETICALLY, IF PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWED

IMMEDIATELY ON THE SIGNATURE OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT, THE WEST COULD FOREGO INCLUDING EXPLICIT SOVIET AND SECRET

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AMERICAN CEILINGS IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT, ON THE BASIS OF EXPLICIT ORAL AGREEMENT WITH THE EAST THAT CEILINGS ON RESIDUAL US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE II AGREEMENT, AS WOULD BE THE SPECIFIC LEVEL OF THE AGREED COMMON CEILING. HOWEVER, THIS IS A RISKY APPROACH WHICH WOULD NOT STAND UP WELL UNDER LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT. HENCE, RESIDUAL LEVELS FOR US AND SOVIET FORCES SHOULD BE AGREED IN WRITING IN BOTH PHASES.

E. COLLECTIVE RESIDUAL TOTALS FOR NATO AND

THE PACT.

25. AGREEMENT ON NUMERICAL COLLECTIVE RESIDUAL TOTALS FOR NATO AND THE PACT AFTER DEDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET WITHDRAWALS FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES, AND INCLUSION OF THIS FIGURE IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT, WOULD BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE. BUT, FROM THE US VIEWPOINT, IT DOES NOT APPEAR AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A AGREEMENT TEXT. IT IS ASSUMED THAT AN AGREED COMMON CEILING LEVEL WOULD OF COURSE BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF NUMBERS IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT. BUT THE PRINCIPLE WESTERN OBJECTIVE IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT IS SERVED IF THERE IS AN UNAMBIGUOUS BARRIER TO INCREASE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. A NUMERICAL CEILING ON EASTERN EUROPEAN FORCES IS LESS ESSENTIAL. MORE-OVER, AS SOON AS THE NATO RESIDUAL TOTAL AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS IS EXPRESSED IN NUMERICAL TERMS, IT IMMEDIATELY POSES THE ISSUE OF THE COLLECTIVE NATURE OF THIS CEILING. PHRASING A NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT IN WORDS RATHER THAN NUMBERS MIGHT MAKE IT POSSIBLE NOT TO HAVE TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT BECAUSE SOME COMPROMISE FORMULATION MIGHT BE FOUND.

26. SOME ALLIES MAY FAVOR INCLUDING A COLLECTIVE CEILING IN NUMERICAL TERMS IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE I AGREEMENT ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES PRECISELY BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD PREJUDICE THE PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS IN FAVOR OF A COLLECTIVE CEILING, AND AGAINST NATIONAL CEILINGS, IN CONNECTION WITH ALLIES
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REDUCTIONS IN PHASE II. SOME ALLIES MAY ALSO FEEL THAT PUTTING NUMBERS INTO A NO-INCREASE AGREEMENT WILL PRODUCE UNAMBIGUOUS STARTING FIGURES FOR PHASE II NEGOTIATIONS. TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH A EASTERN COMMITMENT IN A PHASE I AGREEMENT TO REDUCE TO A COMMON CEILING LEVEL, SUCH FIGURES WOULD AT THE MINIMUM OBLIGE THE EAST TO ELIMINATE THEIR REMAINING GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT EVEN IF DURING PHASE II FOR SOME REASON THE EAST DID NOT WISH TO GO AS LOW AS THE NATO PROPOSED FIGURE FOR THE COMMON CEILING SEVEL.

27. HOWEVER, THE EAST WILL RESIST A COLLECTIVE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT EXPRESSED ONLY IN WORDS. AND SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD REQUIRE THE EAST TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE ALLIES IN YET ANOTHER AREA OF NUMERICAL DATA, THE RESIDUAL STRENGTH OF WARSAW PACT FORCES. WE CONCLUDE THAT, FROM THE NEGOTIATING VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD BE

PREFERABLE NOT TO ESTABLISH THIS REQUIREMENT IF IT COULD
BE AVOIDED AND THAT THE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE
CEILINGS SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR PHASE II IF POSSIBLE.

IV. CONCLUSION

28. THE CONCLUSION FROM THIS BRIEF EXAMINATION IS
THAT THE FOLLOWING ARE MINIMUM NUMBERS REQUIRED FOR A
PHASE I AGREEMENT:

A. EAST-WEST AGREEMENT ON A TOTAL NUMBER OF
SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES TO BE WITHDRAWN TO BE
INCLUDED IN THE TEXT.

B. NUMERICAL SPECIFICATION IN THE TEXT OF A PHASE I
AGREEMENT OF THE RESIDUAL LEVEL TO BE

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MAINTAINED BY THE US AND USSR. NATURALLY, THESE FIGURES

WOULD HAVE TO CORRESPOND TO ALLIED DATA ON STARTING
USSR FORCE TOTALS OR THERE WOULD BE NO AGREEMENT.

29. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT AGREEMENT ON THESE
FIGURES NED NOT DEPEND ON PRIOR EXCHANGE OF DATA. AGREE-
MENT ON THE NUMBER OF FORCES TO BE REDUCED IS OF ITSELF
NOT DEPENDENT ON AGREED DATA. AND, THEORETICALLY, THE
EAST COULD AGREE TO ACCEPT WESTERN PROPOSALS FOR THE
SPECIFIC NUMERICAL RESIDUAL LEVELS FOR INCORPORATION IN
AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT ANY DATA HAVING BEEN EXCHANGED OR
SPECIFICALLY AGREED.

30. APPLYING THESE CONCLUSIONS TO THE CURRENT ALLIED
DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST ON DATA EXCHANGE, WE FIND THAT,
ALTHOUGH DATA DISCUSSION HAS MANY ADVANTAGES FOR THE WEST, IT
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IS NOT NECESSARY TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF DATA WITH THE EAST FOR THE
PURPOSES OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON THESE MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR
A PHASE I AGREEMENT. SPECIFICALLY, IT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY
TO REACH MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON THE STARTING TOTALS FOR EACH SIDE OR
TO AGREE IN SPECIFIC FORM ON THE MODE OF REDUCTIONS, WHETHER IT
BE BY PERCENTAGE OR WHETHER IT WILL BE ASYMMETRICAL OR
SYMMETRICAL, ETC. THE MINIMUM OF NUMBERS ON WHICH FOR REACHING
AGREEMENT SHOULD BE REACHED WITH THE EAST FOR PHASE I IS THE TOTAL
NUMBER OF US AND SOVIET FORCES WHICH WILL BE REDUCED
PLUS THE RESIDUAL LEVEL OF US AND SOVIET FORCES.

31. WESTERN NEGOTIATORS SHOULD IN ANY EVENT
CONTINUE EFFORTS TO GAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO
THE IDEAL SET OF FIGURES LISTED AT THE BEGINNING OF THIS
PAPER. IN ANY EVENT, THE TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS HERE, IF
ACCEPTED, SHOULD BE USED ONLY AS A WORKING HYPOTHESIS
UNTIL FURTHER INFORMATION ON EASTERN ATTITUDES ENABLES
SPECIFIC ALLIED DECISIONS. END TEXT.RESOR

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DATA, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MILITARY INFORMATION PROGRAMS, MILITARY PLANS, MILITARY POLICIES, MILITARY AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 07 APR 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: GolinoFR
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Document Source: CORE
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Film Number: D750120-0026
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750476/aaaacrco.tel
Line Count: 694
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
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Review Transfer Date:
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Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: WHAT NUMERICAL DATA MUST BE AGREED FOR A PHASE I MBFR AGREEMENT
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006